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‘THE LINK WHICH UNITES MAN WITH BRUTES’: ENLIGHTENMENT
FEMINISM, WOMEN AND ANIMALS
Jane Spencer
In her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Mary Wollstonecraft suggests that in the current state
of society it is open to question whether or not woman is ‘the link which unites man with brutes’.1
In this essay I investigate the reasons for and signiﬁcance of this provocative claim, hoping
thereby to illuminate some of the issues raised for feminism by the natural history of the later
eighteenth century.2 Recent scholarship has shown how much the development of feminism
owed both to fundamentally religious arguments and attitudes,3 and to the Enlightenment
science of culture with its progressive understanding of history.4 As Sharon Ruston demonstrates,
eighteenth-century natural history is also an important source for those arguing for rights for
women.5 I argue here that accounts within natural history of the relationship between animals
and humanity had a signiﬁcant, complex, and often problematic inﬂuence on the development
of Enlightenment feminism.
Wollstonecraft’s reference to woman as the link with brutes comes within a passage of specu-
lation about the improvement of human knowledge in the egalitarian world of the future:
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1 M. Wollstonecraft, The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, edited by M. Butler and J. Todd, 7 vols (London: William Pick-
ering, 1989), vol. 5, 104.
2 This essay forms part of my AHRC-funded project ‘Representing Animals in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: Natural
History, Narrative Sympathy, and Animal and Human Rights’. I am grateful to the AHRC for its generosity in supporting
this project through its Research Leave Scheme in 2009. I would also like to thank the University of Exeter for awarding
me a semester’s leave in 2008–9 in support of this project.
3 Women, Gender and Enlightenment, edited by S. Knott and B. Taylor (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005),
xv–xxi; Section 7, 410–518.
4 K. O’Brien,Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
1–34, 68–109.
5 See S. Ruston, ‘Natural Rights and Natural History in Anna Barbauld and Mary Wollstonecraft’, in Essays and Studies
2008: Literature and Science, edited by S. Ruston (Cambridge: DS Brewer, 2008), 53–71; and ‘“How grossly do they
insult us who thus advise us only to render ourselves gentle, domestic brutes!” Women and Domestic Animals in
Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindications’, paper delivered at the Eighteenth-Century Narrative Research Consortium confer-
ence, ‘Romantic Animals’, July 2008, University of Exeter. I am very much indebted to Sharon Ruston’s important
work on this topic, and would like to thank her for her generosity in answering my queries, exchanging ideas with me
and sharing a copy of her unpublished paper. My speciﬁc debts to her work, as well as the different emphasis of my
own argument, are made clear later in this essay.
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It is difﬁcult for us purblind mortals to say to what height human discoveries and improvements may
arrive, when the gloom of despotism subsides, which makes us stumble at every step; but, when mor-
ality shall be settled on a more solid basis, then, without being gifted with a prophetic spirit, I will
venture to predict that woman will be either the friend or slave of man. We shall not, as at present,
doubt whether she is a moral agent, or the link which unites man with brutes. But should it then
appear that like the brutes they were principally created for the use of man, he will let them patiently
bite the bridle, and not mock them with empty praise; or, should their rationality be proved, he will not
impede their improvement merely to gratify his sensual appetites.6
This passage sounds some of the keynotes of Enlightenment feminism: a belief in the essential
rational equality of human beings regardless of sex, and a commitment to the possibility of
social progress. Enlightenment is indeed one of its governing metaphors: we live at present
under the ‘gloom of despotism’ and are consequently stumbling, unable to see our way; but
once this gloom is lifted we will be capable of new discoveries and improvements. The unnatural
despotism of contemporary society has so distorted relations between the sexes that, in fact, we
currently do not know what woman in a natural state would be like. After social revolution, we
can expect to ﬁnd out. ‘We shall not, as at present, doubt whether she is a moral agent, or the link
which unites man with brutes’. I would not want to downplay the lovely sarcasm of the sentence:
Wollstonecraft, of course, is arguing throughout this work that women were indeed created as
rational, and therefore moral agents, and she curls her lip at those who think them a kind of inter-
mediate point between human and animal. But her sardonic tone does not detract from an under-
lying seriousness. Throughout the Vindication Wollstonecraft takes seriously the charge that
women, at least under current social arrangements, are like animals: comparisons, as here, to
horses, or elsewhere in the text to caged birds,7 and to spaniels, proverbial for their submissive-
ness,8 give a lively sense of her recognition of the relevance to human society of natural histor-
ians’ accounts of domesticated animals. It is through her confrontation with some of the claims
being made by natural historians that Wollstonecraft develops arguments with which to
counter that early English opponent of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke, whose conserva-
tism on social hierarchy demanded her response. Her dialogue with natural history helped to form
Wollstonecraft’s particular kind of pro-Revolutionary feminism.
‘The link which unites man with brutes’. What exactly does Wollstonecraft mean? How might
woman be thought of as forming a link between man and animal? In that one word, ‘link’, Woll-
stonecraft evokes two inﬂuential and interrelated discourses. One is the discourse surrounding the
great chain of being, which, as A.O. Lovejoy’s classic account showed, drew on Platonic and
Aristotelian ideas and was widely inﬂuential among European thinkers from the middle ages
through to the late eighteenth century. It worked by bringing together what Lovejoy named the
two principles of plenitude and continuity. The (Platonic) principle of plenitude is the belief
that God, as the perfect and inexhaustible source of all creation, must have created all the
kinds of being that it was possible for Him to create: no potential for existence can have been
left unfulﬁlled.9 The (Aristotelian) principle of continuity is the belief that Nature does not
contain clear and strict divisions between one kind of entity and another. While Plato considered
6 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 104.
7 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 125.
8 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 152.
9 A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1936), 50–5.
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that entities were hierarchically ordered, Aristotle was the main source for later naturalists’
arrangement of life into a hierarchical series from the highest to lowest forms of existence.10
The steps between one kind of existence and the next were understood to be vanishingly
small. Between any two different kinds of being there would always be something which
partook of the nature of both: the classic example being man himself, who belonged both to
the animal world below him, and the spiritual world (of cherubim, angels, and so on) above
him.11 A link is the perfect metaphor for this conception of continuity and overlap: each link
in a chain only belongs to (and helps constitute) the chain by virtue of overlapping and interlock-
ing with the links on either side.
While the notion of a single hierarchical chain or scale was increasingly questioned by the end
of the eighteenth century, it remained an inﬂuential idea even among many of those committed to
challenging human hierarchies. In 1790 Catherine Macaulay, radical egalitarian and Enlighten-
ment feminist, could still write: ‘That there is a chain of subordination which gradually descends
from the highest possible excellence which can be enjoyed by a ﬁnite being, down to the lowest
form of animated life, we have great cause to believe’.12 Macaulay had a profound inﬂuence on
Wollstonecraft, who adopted and developed many ideas from the Letters on Education in the Vin-
dication of the Rights of Woman, but the two writers differed on the question of the chain.
The other, related discourse whichWollstonecraft evokes with her reference to the ‘link’ is con-
temporary natural history. She lived in an age when European knowledge of the natural world had
been transformed by empirical investigations into animal and plant life, as well as by the discov-
ery of new species in the course of global exploration.13 The Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus had
worked out and published, in the successive editions of his Systema Natura, from 1735 onwards, a
method for organising nature into orders, families, genera and species that forms the basis for
modern taxonomy.14 The French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, had pro-
vided in his multi-volume Histoire Naturelle, published from 1749 to 1788, a detailed account
of the characteristics of a huge number of quadrupeds, birds, ﬁsh, insects, plants, minerals and
other natural phenomena, which was translated into English and widely disseminated.15 The
second half of the eighteenth century was a time of intense interest in natural history, with
popular adaptations and compendiums making new discoveries and ideas widely available to a
growing middle-class audience. Wollstonecraft was well-read in this tradition. Among her assign-
ments as a writer for Joseph Johnson’s Analytical Review was an abridged English version of
Buffon’s Natural History in 1790.16 In the same year she wrote an extensive review17 of
William Smellie’s Philosophy of Natural History, a series of reﬂections on the philosophical
and social implications of the natural historians’ discoveries: a work with which, as we will
see, she had some major disagreements.
10 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 55–8.
11 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 227, 231.
12 C. Macaulay, Letters on Education. With Observations on Religious and Metaphysical Subjects (London, 1790), 8–9.
13 See D.E. Allen, The Naturalist in Britain: A Social History (London: Penguin, 1976).
14 C. Linnaeus, Systema Naturae, 10th edition 1758, facsimile (London: British Museum, 1956); W.T. Stearn, ‘Appendix
1’, in W. Blunt, Linnaeus: The Compleat Naturalist, introduction by W.T. Stearn (London: Francis Lincoln, 2004), 256–
63.
15 G.L.L. comte de Buffon, The Natural History of Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals; with the Theory of the Earth in
General, translated by W. Kenrick and J. Murdoch, 6 vols (London, 1775–6); Natural History, General and Particular,
translated by W. Smellie, 9 vols (Edinburgh, 1780–5).
16 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 7, 411.
17 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 7, 293–300.
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Eighteenth-century natural historians continued to ﬁt their new ideas into the frame of the chain
of being.18 Their understanding of the variety of living species grew within the idea of a single,
continuous scale along which all living organisms could be placed, from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’. The
application of the principle of continuity to natural history meant that they saw distinctions
between species and kinds as ﬁnely graduated. The application of the principle of plenitude
meant that God must have created all possible varieties. Put these two together and, in theory,
wherever two distinct beings are found next to each other on the chain it should be possible to
ﬁnd a third being in between the two with characteristics of both – the ‘link’ between them.
The borderline between plant and animal, for example, was in principle a very ﬁne one. There
must be something that was both plant- and animal-like. The freshwater polyp Hydra was
hailed as missing link between plants and animals, moving like an animal but reproducing like
a plant.19 Wherever there seemed to be a big division between kinds of being, a link could be
found. As the Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet explained:
THERE are no sudden changes in nature; all is gradual, and elegantly varied. If there should happen a
vacuum between any two beings, how could the passage be effected from one to the other? There is
then no being which has not either above or beneath it some that resemble it in certain characters,
and widely differ from it in others.
Amongst these characters which distinguish beings, we discover some that are more or less general.
Whence we derive our distributions into classes, genera, and species.
These distributions cannot cut off any thing. There always consist between two classes and two like
genera, mean productions, which seem not to belong more to one than to the other, but to connect them
both.
The polypus links the vegetable to the animal. The ﬂying squirrel unites the bird to the quadruped.
The ape bears some afﬁnity to the quadruped and the man.20
In the search for missing links, one link in particular seemed signiﬁcant – the connection between
humanity and the non-human animals. The border between humanity and the ‘brute’ beasts par-
ticularly fascinated, and troubled, eighteenth-century thinkers, as the chain’s principle of continu-
ity had the potential to threaten the sense of a clear demarcation between human and animal.
Natural historians looked to ‘lower’ kinds of human being for an afﬁnity with the ‘brute’
beasts, and to the ‘higher’ animals for similarities with ‘mankind’.21
In this context we can begin to see whyWollstonecraft refers to ‘the link which unites man with
brutes’. But why does she, however ironically, suggest that woman, in her current state, might
fulﬁl that role? One reason for the connection is easily found. As more recent generations of fem-
inist scholarship have amply demonstrated, woman and non-human animals have been conjoined
in the history of Western thought.22 In the Greek philosophic tradition, and in the later Christian
18 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 227–30; F. Moran, ‘Between Primates and Primitives: Natural Man as the Missing
Link in Rousseau’s Second Discourse’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 54:1 (1993), 37–58.
19 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 231–3.
20 C. Bonnet, The Contemplation of Nature. Translated from the French of C. Bonnet, 2 vols (London, 1766), vol. 1, 24.
21 On this see W.D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812 (Baltimore, Maryland:
Penguin, 1969); R. Nash, Wild Enlightenment: The Borders of Human Identity in the Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville
and London: University of Virginia Press, 2003); L. Schiebinger,Nature’s Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004).
22 G. Lloyd, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1984); V. Plumwood,
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).
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doctrines that draw so heavily upon it, woman is extensively construed as a lesser or imperfect
human being, partaking only partially or sometimes not at all in the higher reason that character-
izes the proper perfection of man’s nature. Where man is understood as a partially spiritual and
intellectual, partly animal and bodily, being, woman is seen as existing closer to that lower,
bodily, animal nature and often as threatening, through the force of her sexuality, to drag her
male companion down towards the animal realm. Within eighteenth-century satire there are
some references to women’s alleged afﬁnity with monkeys. Jonathan Swift, in a widely reprinted
and popular letter to a bride, wrote:
when you are among yourselves, how naturally, after the ﬁrst compliments, do you apply your hands to
each others [sic] lappets, rufﬂes, and mantuas; as if the whole business of your lives, and the publick
concern of the world, depended upon the cut and colour of your dresses. As divines say, that some
people take more pains to be damned, than it would cost them to be saved; so your sex employs
more thought, memory, and application to be fools, than would serve to make them wise and
useful. When I reﬂect on this, I cannot conceive you to be human creatures, but a sort of species
hardly a degree above a monkey; who has more diverting tricks than any of you, is an animal less mis-
chievous and expensive, might in time be a tolerable critick in velvet and brocade, and, for aught I
know, would equally become them.23
Wollstonecraft noted this passage in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, taking issue with the
idea that woman ‘naturally’ act in this way: ‘And very natural it is – for they have not any business
to interest them’, she wrote. To stop women being monkeys, in her view, would mean ‘turning
their thoughts to the grand pursuits that exalt the human race’.24
In serious natural history of the time, however, woman is not said to be the link which unites
man with brutes. That distinction is usually given to the ‘orang-outang’, a term derived from the
Malay for ‘man of the woods’, introduced into European natural history by Nicolaas Tulp in the
seventeenth century,25 and commonly applied in the eighteenth century to the large apes both of
Asia and Africa – to the animals we now call orangutans and also to chimpanzees.26 Edward
Tyson’s inﬂuential 1699 account of his dissection of an orang-outang (in fact a chimpanzee)
established the close anatomical similarities between this animal and humanity.27 In 1790,
Smellie distilled the received wisdom of the past century when he observed:
In descending the scale of animation, the next step, it is humiliating to remark, is very short. Man, in his
lowest condition, is evidently linked, both in the form of his body and the capacity of his mind, to the
large and small orang-outangs. These again, by another slight gradation, are connected to the apes,
23 J. Swift, The Works of the Rev. Dr. Swift (London, 1784), vol. 5, 147.
24 Wollstonecraft, Works, Vol. 5, 259.
25 N. Tulp, Observationum Medicarum, libri tres (Amsterdam, 1641), 274.
26 C. Niekirk, ‘Man and Orang-utan in Eighteenth-Century Thinking: Retracing the history of Dutch and German Anthro-
pology’,Monatshefte, 96:4 (2004), 477–92. I use the term ‘orang-outang’ throughout to refer to the animal as discussed in
eighteenth-century accounts, to maintain a distinction between the animal of eighteenth-century conception and the oran-
gutans, chimpanzees and other great apes as classiﬁed today. Moran points out that that various animals were discussed
using the term ‘orang-outang’ and that many of those speculating on the orang-outang’s relation to humanity had not seen
great apes and were relying on the anthropomorphic accounts of travellers, so that when considering their views ‘it is best
to try to erase any preconceptions one might have about the kind of animal being discussed and imagine that one has never
seen a chimpanzee, orang-utan, or gorilla’ (39).
27 R. Wokler, ‘Tyson and Buffon on the Orang-utan’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 155 (1976),
2301–19.
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who, like the former, have no tails […] The monkeys, who form the next link, have long tails, and ter-
minate this partial chain of imitative animals, which have such a detestable resemblance to the human
frame and manners.28
Eighteenth-century naturalists frequently depicted the orang-outang in ways that emphasized
this link with humanity. Tyson’s illustration of a male walking upright and holding a stick was
frequently reprinted, while one of Tulp’s illustrations of an orang-outang in a seated pose with
genitals hidden and eyes averted was widely copied and presented as a ‘modest’ female.29
Some thinkers, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his 1755 Discourse on Inequality and the
Scottish philosopher Lord Monboddo, went so far as to see the orang-outang as a human being in
a primitive state prior to the acquisition of language.30 Most authorities, though, maintained that
the orang-outang was a brute beast to be clearly differentiated from mankind. So, in keeping with
the principles of plenitude and continuity, it was still necessary to search for a link on the human
side – a sort of sub-human type that was closer to the orang-outang than most mankind. This link
was sought in an inferior race. In the passage from his Philosophy of Natural History cited above,
Smellie refers to ‘Man, in his lowest condition’ as being close to the ‘orang-outang’. A little
earlier in the same work he makes it clear that the deﬁnition of man ‘in his lowest condition’
is a racial one: he refers to the ‘stupid Huron’ and the ‘Hottentot’ as the kinds of human being
furthest away from the high condition of the ‘profound philosopher’ (522). In this he is typical
of his time. Rather than one of the human genders, it was a human race that was assigned the
place on the chain next to the orang-outang: most often, black Africans were the people
chosen for this position.31 Indeed the eighteenth-century notion of female nature as complemen-
tary to, rather than simply lesser than, male nature, was rather at odds with the linear hierarchy of
the chain of being, making it difﬁcult to know how to ﬁt women into the chain.32
The afﬁnity between the lowest human and the highest brute was however usually demon-
strated through a female sexual route. Male orang-outangs were thought to rape Hottentot
women,33 making the lowest human female the sexual victim of the highest brute male; conver-
sely, female chimps were believed to exhibit a sexual modesty very like that of well-brought-up
European women, implying that modesty as a sexual virtue was not, as Wollstonecraft argued, an
artiﬁcial human construct, but a natural female attribute shared by different species.34 So the
implications of the orang-outang as link were interpreted to the detriment of women, implying
their less than full human separation from the highest ape. Wollstonecraft, whose reading in
28 W. Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History (Edinburgh, 1790), 523.
29 The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century illustrations of apes are discussed in Moran, ‘Between Primates and Primi-
tives’; Schiebinger, Nature’s Body; and Niekerk, ‘Man and Orang-utan in Eighteenth-Century Thinking’; and in
M. Kemp, The Human Animal in Western Art and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). Kemp (188)
considers Tulp’s illustration of the orang-outang (in this case a chimpanzee) to be a male, but later copies of this
image interpreted it as female and added feminising touches (Schiebinger, Nature’s Body, 106). Schiebinger (75–114)
discusses the emphasis on modesty and manners – but also the concentration on genitals and breasts – in discussions
of female apes, and reproduces the most important of the contemporary illustrations.
30 J-J Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, translated by M. Cranston (London: Penguin, 1984); J.B. Lord Monboddo, Of
the Origin and Progress of Language, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1773). See R. Wokler, ‘The Ape Debates in Enlightenment
Anthropology’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 192 (1980), 1164–75.
31 W.D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812 (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1969),
228–32.
32 Schiebinger, Nature’s Body, 158–9.
33 Schiebinger, Nature’s Body, 94–8.
34 Schiebinger, Nature’s Body, 99–106.
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natural history would have made her familiar with this idea, may well have been prompted by it to
make her satiric substitute of woman as the missing link in place of the usual suspect.
There are also, I shall argue, some more speciﬁc and immediate reasons why, when writing the
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft homed in on the idea of woman as the link
between man and brute. To understand these we need to consider the question of the relationship
between woman and animals within the ideas of Enlightenment feminism. In spite of the long
Western tradition of considering woman as a lesser being, there have always been attempts to
assert woman’s full human dignity and to argue that the spiritual equality of woman’s soul,
often acknowledged within the Christian tradition, should issue in a higher valuation of the
female in mortal life. The feminism of the seventeenth-century thinkers Marie de Gournay,
Anna Maria Van Schurmann, François Poulain de la Barre and others helped form the universalist
concept of equality that was central to Enlightenment views.35
Cartesianism has been recognised as an important inﬂuence on feminist thought in the early
Enlightenment.36 Descartes’ insistence on the rational capacity of human beings, their ability to
seek out the truths of the universe through the operations of a mind all shared in common, held lib-
erating potential for women. Cartesian thought, with its strong reinforcement of dualism – the dual-
isms of spirit andmatter, mind and body, human and animal – offered the opportunity for women to
shake off those old ideas tying the female to the animal body. The body could be thought of as ines-
sential; the mind, in which what was essentially human lived, could be understood as being of no
sex. Feminism could develop through and in a commitment to the rational equality of all human
souls, as explained by the seventeenth-century French feminist François Poulain de la Barre:
It is easie to be Remarked, That the Difference of Sexes, regards only the Body: there being no other,
but that Part (properly) which serves for the Production of Men: And, the Spirit concurring no other
way but by its Consent (which it lends to all after the same manner) we may conclude, That in it
there is no Sex at all.37
It followed that women’s brains worked just like men’s:
when we consider onely the Head, the sole organe of sciences, and where the soul exerciseth all its
functions; the most exact Anatomy remarks to us no difference in this part between Men, and
Women, their brain is altogether like to ours.38
Modern feminist thought has been critical of a mental liberation dependent on Cartesian
dualism.39 It required, it has been said, a turning away from women’s bodies, from their gendered
speciﬁcity and their sexual desires, in order to validate the unsexed mind. The standard for the
human mind itself, though ostensibly unsexed, was adopted from notions of reason which
were themselves developed through the symbolic exclusion of the feminine.40 These notions
35 S. Stuurman, ‘The Deconstruction of Gender: Seventeenth-century Feminism and Modern Equality’, in Knott and
Taylor, Gender and Enlightenment, 416–33.
36 J. Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4–8; H.L.
Smith, Reason’s Disciples: Seventeenth-Century English Feminists (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).
37 F. Poulain de la Barre, The Woman as Good as the Man, or, the Equality of Both Sexes, translated by A.L. (London,
1677), 84.
38 Poulain de la Barre, The Woman as Good as the Man, 85–6.
39 Lloyd, The Man of Reason, 44–60.
40 Lloyd, The Man of Reason, x, 2–3.
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required women, in order to assert their full humanity, to acquiesce in the radical split between
human and animal, reason and nature, which current ecological thinking sees as the root cause
of attitudes and actions that are devastating the planet. Val Plumwood analyses the malaise of
modern thinking as inhering in an ambition to master nature, rooted in what she calls the ‘key
dualism’ of reason and nature. What Plumwood calls the ‘master-identity’ is the perspective of
power, combining racial, gender and class exclusions to set up the white male euro-centric
ruling class as the subject and master, marginalizing those who depart from that norm by
seeing them as allied to nature, not sharing the master’s full humanity and reason.41 Different lib-
eratory movements including feminism need to ﬁnd a way to ﬁnd freedom from oppression
without making the mistake of aspiring to that master identity for themselves.42 According to
this analysis, one could see Enlightenment feminism, with its assertion of female rationality, as
getting itself caught on the wrong side of what is now a divide between those whose humanity
is fundamentally alienated from nature, that is, those for whom human progress consists in the
domination of nature, and whose legacy is now producing ecological catastrophe on an unprece-
dented and frightening scale; and those who would tie their ideas of justice and progress to a fun-
damental care for the planet, who would see no true liberation for women possible outside of a full
recognition that we are indeed (though of course, no more and no less so than men) animals
belonging to the earth.
Recent work calls into question the dependence of early feminism on Cartesian dualism,
however. Jacqueline Broad shows how women from Margaret Cavendish to Catharine Cockburn
not only used Cartesian arguments, but also argued with and modiﬁed them, especially in the light
of the ideas of the Cambridge Platonists, in such a way as to refuse a radical mind-body dualism,
insisting instead on according importance and dignity both to bodies and animals. The traditional
notion of closeness between woman and the animal could lead women philosophers to more than
one reaction: not necessarily to denial, but sometimes to an unusual degree of sympathy for
animals, and, especially in Cavendish, a pioneering sense of the kinship between humanity and
animal.43 At its inception, Enlightenment feminism was trying to bring together arguments for
female rational equality with recognition of the body’s claims and a refusal to devalue animal
nature or animals themselves.
Late eighteenth-century English feminists such as Catherine Macaulay, Mary Wollstonecraft
and Mary Hays also combined rational egalitarianism with sympathy for animals. All three
wrote of the importance of opposing cruelty to animals. As I argue, however, in this period
what we can call an early alliance between feminism and animal advocacy came under strong
pressure from renewed attempts to deﬁne female nature along animal lines, attempts which threa-
tened the still developing view, so crucial to feminist thought, of woman’s current nature as the
artiﬁcial product of an unjust society. That alliance between feminism and animal advocacy is still
strong in Catherine Macaulay, as I shall show, but Wollstonecraft turns away from it.
Karen O’Brien describes Enlightenment views of women as characterised by tension
between two tendencies: the ‘naturalist’ or biologically essentialist tendency and the ‘socio-
logical’ or social constructivist tendency.44 Eighteenth-century medical science45 and
41 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 42–5.
42 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 64–7, 136–40.
43 Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, 50–5.
44 K. O’Brien, ‘Introduction’ to Section 1, ‘Sexual Distinctions and Prescriptions’, in Knott and Taylor, Gender and
Enlightenment, 3–7.
45 O’Brien, ‘Introduction’, 3.
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anthropology46 are sources for a new emphasis on the physiological and psychological differ-
ences between the sexes, in contrast to the sociological work being developed particularly by
Scottish Enlightenment historians, who considered that historical progress was bringing about
a ‘greater social and intellectual convergence of the sexes’.47 To understand these tensions in
Enlightenment views of women we need to see eighteenth-century natural history, from which
the discipline of anthropology was emerging in the late eighteenth century, as a crucially
important discourse. The natural historians’ discussions of animals and of the animal-human
boundary had vital effects on the social and political theories of the time. The tendency
within natural history to study mankind as one of the animals led to a renewed emphasis
on woman’s nature as deﬁned by her sexual and reproductive role, prompting a feminist
response reafﬁrming the importance of human difference and the centrality of un-gendered
human reason. But natural history was by no means an entirely naturalist discourse in
O’Brien’s sense. One of its strains, as we shall see, was eminently sociological, suggesting
as it did the social formation of animal bodies. It was a rich and mixed discourse with a
very mixed inﬂuence.
Eighteenth-century natural historians presented accounts of the animal creation in which man
appeared as one of the animals, however specially positioned among them. In Linnean taxonomy
‘he’ is one of the mammals (a termed coined by Linnaeus) and within that, one of the primates
(also a Linnean term). Indeed Linnaeus was moving towards seeing no distinction in kind
between human and animals. As he wrote to the German naturalist Johann Gmelin in 1747:
I ask you and the whole world for a generic differentia between man and ape which conforms to the
principles of natural history. I certainly know of none. […] If I were to call man ape or vice versa, I
should bring down all the theologians on my head. But perhaps I should still do it according to the
rules of science.48
Such ideas, along with Rousseau’s and Monboddo’s contention for the humanity of the orang-
outang, had the potential to challenge human exceptionalism. They were strongly countered by
other naturalists. Buffon, for example, author of the most inﬂuential account of animal life and
habits, was against any attempt to do away with the boundary between human and animal. For
him, humanity’s distinctive difference resided outside the natural historian’s province, in the
immaterial soul. The orang-outang might be physically very close to humanity, but that was com-
paratively insigniﬁcant:
If there was a step by which we could descend from human nature to the animal; if the essence of this
nature consisted entirely in the form of the body, and depended on its organization, this ape would
approach nearer to man than to any animal […] but the resemblance of the form, the conformity of
the organization, and the imitation, which seem to result from those similitudes, neither bring it
nearer the nature of man, nor raises it above that of animals.49
46 J. Mander, ‘No Woman is an Island: The Female Figure in French Enlightenment Anthropology’, in Knott and Taylor,
Gender and Enlightenment, 97–116 (99).
47 O’Brien, ‘Introduction’, 3.
48 Cited in G. Broberg, ‘Homo sapiens: Linnaeus’s Classiﬁcation of Man’, in Linnaeus: The Man and His Work, edited by
T. Frängsmyr (Canton, MA: Watson, 1994), 156–94 (172).
49 Buffon, The Natural History of Animals, vol. 3, 449–50.
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In this way Buffon, like earlier thinkers, was able to subscribe to the concept of the chain of being
and yet avoid its implication of human closeness to the animal by making the human link in the
chain a special one, the point where a rational soul is ﬁrst found.
Just as eighteenth-century naturalists held differing views on the boundary between human and
animal, natural history also encompassed a variety of views (often within the same author) on the
relation between the physical organization of animal bodies and the kinds of social behaviour they
exhibited. We can see in it the elements of the nature-nurture debate that has carried on down to
our own time. An essentialist strand of thought placed humans among the animals and saw their
social arrangements as determined by their bodies. Smellie, for example, derived male dominance
over women from the physical differences between the sexes:
All the larger and more perfect animals are distinguished by the sexes of male and female. The bodies
of males, though not without exceptions, are, in general, stronger, larger, and more active, than those of
the females. In the human species, the male is not only larger than the female, but his muscular ﬁbres
are ﬁrmer and more compact, and his whole frame indicates a superior strength and robustness of
texture. He does not acquire his full growth, and best form, till he arrives at the age of thirty years.
But, in women, the parts are rounder, and their muscular ﬁbres more feeble and lax than those of
men, and their growth and form are perfect at the age of twenty. A similar observation is applicable
to the minds of the two sexes. Man is, comparatively, a bold, generous, and enterprising animal.
Women, on the contrary, are timid, jealous, and disposed to actions which acquire less agility and
strength. Hence they are entitled to claim, and, by their amiable weaknesses, they actually receive
our protection. Men are endowed with majesty of ﬁgure and force of mind; but beauty, and the
graces, are the proper characteristics of women. The laxity and softness of their texture may, in
some measure, account for the timidity and littlenesses of their disposition; for, when the bodies of
men are relaxed by heat, or by any other cause, their minds become not only timid, but weak, unde-
termined, and inactive.50
A more social constructivist strand within natural history considered that among all animals, and
not only humans, environmental circumstances could alter physical nature. A favourite theme of
Buffon, taken up and disseminated by his imitators, was that the domestication and domination of
animals by man had changed their appearance. Reasoning in a way that seems to anticipate
elements of later Lamarckian ideas, Buffon argues in ‘History of the dog’ that generations of sub-
jection to mankind have caused dogs progressively to lower their ears – a gesture of submission –
so that some breeds of dog now are born with ﬂoppy ears:
of the mastiff, and the bull-dog, the ears are still partly straight, or only half-pendant; and in their
manners and sanguinary disposition they resemble the dog from which they drew their origin. The
hound is the most distant of the three [from original dogs]: the long pendant ears, the docility, gentle-
ness, and, we may say, timidity of this dog, are so many proofs of the great degeneration, or, better
perhaps to express it, the great perfection, which a long state of domesticity has produced, joined to
a careful, and well-followed education.51
Even the camel’s hump, for Buffon, is a consequence of its ‘slavery’ as a beast of burden.52
50 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 236.
51 Buffon, The Natural History of Animals, vol. 2, 67.
52 Buffon, The Natural History of Animals, vol. 4, 22.
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Feminist writers in the later eighteenth century responded to these debates as they considered
the natural and social states of woman. Sharon Ruston has shown that Wollstonecraft’s second
Vindication exploits the social constructivist strand within natural history to draw parallels
between the domestication of dogs and horses and the domestication of women. To thinkers
like Rousseau, James Fordyce and John Gregory, who would argue that women’s submissive be-
haviour towards and endeavours to attract men demonstrate that they are naturally formed for a
state of dependence, Wollstonecraft retorted that many generations of tyranny had caused women
to degenerate, just as spaniels had degenerated into ﬂoppy-eared pets. Servitude, she wrote, ‘not
only debases the individual, but its effects seem to be transmitted to posterity. Considering the
length of time that women have been dependent, is it surprising that some of them hug their
chains, and fawn like the spaniel?’53 Unlike Buffon, who was unsure whether to praise or
deplore dogs’ descent into docility, Wollstonecraft was quite clear that domestication marked a
decline in animals and women. Her ideas were taken up in feminist thinking at the end of the
century. In her Appeal to the Men of Great Britain, in Behalf of the Women (1798), Wollstone-
craft’s friend Mary Hays developed the idea of women as tormented animals, their obedience and
seeming content the end result of cruel training:
EVEN inferior animals are taught not only to dance, but to dance to appearance in time, and with alac-
rity, when their tyrant pipes. Bears and Turkeys for example. But we ought not to forget, that to produce
these wonderful exertions; the ﬁrst have had their eyes put out, to render them more docile to the cruel
caprice of man; and that nothing less than hot iron applied to the feet of the latter, had furnished that
singular spectacle, with which many had the barbarity to be amused.
So alas! women often go through scenes with apparent cheerfulness, that did the most indifferent
spectators, but consider what such appearances must have previously cost them, they would execrate
the mean and sordid tyranny.54
Later in the text Hays generalises the point to make a statement about the origin of racial and
sexual inequalities:
I hold it as an infallible truth, and a truth that few will attempt to deny; that any race of people, or I
should rather say any class of rational being, – though by no means inferior originally in intellectual
endowments, – may be held in a state of subjection and dependence from generation to generation,
by another party, who, by a variety of circumstances, none of them depending on actual, original super-
iority of mind, may have established an authority over them. And it must be acknowledged a truth
equally infallible, that any class so held in a state of subjection and dependence, will degenerate
both in body and mind.55
In this way, natural history made a positive contribution to the development of a feminist analy-
sis of socially produced inequality. Its more essentialist strand, however, in which natural bodily
differences were understood to lead to natural relations of power and dominance, presented pro-
blems for feminist thinking. Wollstonecraft is the feminist thinker who tackles this issue head-on.
Throughout the Vindication of the Rights of Woman she makes references to men’s superiority of
bodily strength, a trait she explicitly associates, in the ﬁrst edition, with a male sexual aggression
assumed to exist in all animals, man included: ‘the male pursues, the female yields – this is the law
53 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 152; Ruston, ‘Natural Rights and Natural History’, 67–8.
54 M. Hays, Appeal to the Men of Great Britain in Behalf of the Women (London, 1798), 58.
55 Hays, Appeal to the Men of Great Britain, 69.
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of nature; and it does not seem to be suspended or abrogated in favour of woman’.56 As Wollsto-
necraft’s editors observe, the changes made between the ﬁrst and second editions of the Vindi-
cation move in the direction of ‘a more deﬁnite acceptance of equality between the sexes’.57
Where the ﬁrst edition attributes ‘this physical superiority’ to men, the second allows only ‘a
degree of physical superiority’.58 Nevertheless, the new trend within natural history and its off-
shoot, an emergent anthropology, towards seeing the mind as determined by the body, continued
to inﬂuence and trouble the text. ‘I ﬁnd that strength of mind has, in most cases, been
accompanied by superior strength of body’, Wollstonecraft remarks,59 and geniuses like Shakes-
peare and Milton ‘must have had iron frames’. The tone becomes uneasy at this point: ‘I am aware
that this argument would carry me further than it may be supposed I would wish to go’, she
acknowledges. Men’s bodily strength is a superiority, but the two sexes should aim for virtue
and knowledge that would be ‘the same in nature, if not in degree’.60 Wollstonecraft’s concession
that ‘from the constitution of their bodies, men seem designed by Providence to attain a greater
degree of virtue’61 contrasts with the conﬁdent declaration of the equality of the female soul, and
therefore brain, in the earlier feminist Poulain de la Barre, indicating the extent to which new phy-
sicalist ideas challenged egalitarian positions. Moreover, even Wollstonecraft’s insistence on the
similar nature of the sexes’ virtue used terms that others were beginning to apply to the relation
between species: the argument that the mental powers of animals differed in degree rather than in
nature from men’s was one of the more radical ideas held by some of the natural historians,
including Smellie. With arguments from natural history pushing her in directions she did not
wish to go, Wollstonecraft turned towards a dualist position. Her arguments for women’s poten-
tial depended on her considering men and women in something other than their physical or animal
aspect; and this affected her views of the relation between humans and animals. For her, what
humans shared with animals was, in traditional fashion, the lower part of their nature.
We can begin to bring Wollstonecraft’s views on the animal-human relation into focus by com-
paring some of her ideas with those of her closest feminist inspiration, Catherine Macaulay.
Macaulay’s Letters on Education is an important source for Wollstonecraft’s claim that
women are currently in a degraded, unnatural state. Macaulay proclaims a radical social construc-
tivism that she derives from Lord Monboddo:
It is the capital and distinguishing characteristic of our species, says lord Monboddo, that we can make
ourselves as it were over again, so that the original nature is so little obvious, that it is with great difﬁ-
culty we can distinguish it from the acquired.
The attention I have given to my own character, Hortensia, and to the means by which it has been
formed, obliges me to subscribe, without reserve, to this opinion of the Scottish sage, viz. that man, in a
state of society, is as artiﬁcial a being as his representation on the canvas of the painter. Nature indeed
supplies the raw materials, and the capacity of the workman; but the effect is the mere production of art.
I have often smiled, when I have heard persons talk of their natural propensities; for I am convinced,
that these have undergone so great a change by domestic education, and the converse of the world, that
their primitive modes are not in many beings even discernable [sic].62
56 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 74.
57 M. Butler and J. Todd, ‘Introduction’, in Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 61.
58 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 74.
59 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 207.
60 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 108.
61 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 95.
62 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 10–11.
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Monboddo’s belief in human self-fashioning serves Macaulay to develop her argument about the
progressive possibilities of education. In important respects, then, her argument emphasizes
human uniqueness. In other ways, though, she lays a special emphasis on human kinship with
animals. The ﬁrst of the Letters, in which she argues for the importance of her subject, opens strik-
ingly on an assertion of the immortality of animal souls. The reader has to assume that prior to the
text, Macaulay has been putting forward the argument for animal souls to her friend. She opens:
‘So you approve, Hortensia, of what I have advanced in favour of the future existence of brute
animals’,63 and quickly goes on to deplore human exaggeration of the difference between our-
selves and other animals:
it raises in me a mixed sentiment of contempt and anger, to hear the vain and contradictory creature,
man, addressing the deity, as the god of all perfection, yet dealing out a severe and short mortality to the
various tribes of his fellow animals, and assigning to himself an eternity of happiness, beyond even the
reach of his imagination. What was man, before he was called into existence, but the dust of the earth?
Can the meanest insect be less; and if man and brute were on an equal footing before the almighty ﬁat
went forth, what motive, worthy of divine wisdom, could inﬂuence the deity to draw the line of sep-
aration thus wide between his creatures?64
She calls on the clergy to lead a campaign against cruelty to animals:
I […] have often wondered that the clergy have not […] laid more force on the necessity of extending
our benevolence to the dumb animals, and that they have not in particular more strongly and more
repeatedly reprobated every species of cruelty towards them, as opposite to the dictates both of
natural and received religion.65
For Macaulay, God’s love of all animals and provision of an afterlife for them is a necessary part
of his complete power and benevolence; and it is on the concept of God’s all-powerful and all-
encompassing benevolence that she pins her argument for the social improvements that
humans can effect through the right kinds of education and self-fashioning. In this way her fem-
inist remarks on the need to reform women’s education are linked with, because depending on the
same reasoning as, her animal advocacy.
If we turn from Macaulay to the opening of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of
Woman, we immediately notice a striking difference of tone. Wollstonecraft opens with a call
to go back to ‘ﬁrst principles’ so as to found a new vision of society on ‘simple truths’. In
order to do this she asks and answers a few ‘plain questions’:
In what does man’s pre-eminence over the brute creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a
half is less than the whole; in Reason.
What acquirement exalts one being above another? Virtue; we spontaneously reply.
For what purpose were the passions implanted? That man by struggling with them might attain a
degree of knowledge denied to the brutes; whispers Experience.66
63 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 1.
64 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 1–2.
65 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 6.
66 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 81.
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Where Macaulay opened on what we share with our fellow animals, Wollstonecraft opens on
what distinguishes us from them. The differences between them should not be exaggerated.
Their opinions on human-animal relations agree in all essentials. Both consider humanity distin-
guished by reason; both deplore cruelty to animals. Wollstonecraft’s 1788 children’s book, Orig-
inal Stories from Real Life, opened with three chapters centred on the treatment of animals.67 Like
other children’s writers of the time, such as Dorothy Kilner and Sarah Trimmer, she taught kind-
ness to animals as an important duty, but like them she stressed human separation: animals lack
reason, and kindness to them serves, among other things, as a means for children to demonstrate
their human superiority.68 In her Vindication of the Rights of Men, probably inﬂuenced here by
Macaulay, Wollstonecraft speculated on animal afterlife in a footnote: ‘I do not now mean to
discuss the intricate subject of their [animals’] mortality; reason may, perhaps, be given to
them in the next stage of existence, if they are to mount in the scale of life, like men, by the
medium of death’.69 In the second Vindication she argued that boys’ cruelty to brutes would
turn later into ‘domestic tyranny over wives, children, and servants’, recommended that kindness
to animals be taught in national schools,70 and considered that ‘[j]ustice, or even benevolence,
will not be a powerful spring of action unless it extend to the whole creation’.71 The emphasis
of the two writers, however, is very different, because their discussions of animal life are
being put to very different uses. For Macaulay, the same reasoning that leads her to conclude
that women need a rational education leads her also to emphasize human fellowship with
animals. For Wollstonecraft, woman’s place in a humanity radically distinguished from animal
life is the foundation of feminist argument.
What is the source of this difference? Macaulay’s stance on animals derives from her religious
framework: a progressive Anglicanism in tune with elements of rational Dissent,72 which allows
her to promote the idea of kinship and sympathy between human and animal without disturbing
her sense of woman’s human superiority. The notion of the chain of being works for her as a way
of expressing a close relation between human and animal in which the animal remains subordi-
nate, but the status difference is de-emphasised. Wollstonecraft’s religious outlook has a lot in
common with Macaulay’s, and like Macaulay, she makes religious belief a base for feminist argu-
ment.73 But for Wollstonecraft, writing in 1792, two works which she had read in the preceding
couple of years, and against which she had had a strong reaction, shattered the alliance between
women’s advocacy and animal advocacy, prompted a strong reassertion of human exceptional-
ism, and led her to reject the concept of the chain of being. These works were Smellie’s Philos-
ophy of Natural History, and Burke’s Reﬂections on the Revolution in France.
We have already seen already how Smellie’s notion of gender relations ran directly counter to
the ideas Wollstonecraft was developing through her reading of Macaulay. Smellie derived
woman’s weaker constitution of mind from her weaker body, and he was enthusiastic in his
praise of female modesty, considered as an instinct, ‘the great defence with which Nature has
67 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 4, 367–79.
68 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 4, 372. See T. Cosslett, Talking Animals in British Children’s Fiction, 1786–1914 (Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2006).
69 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 31.
70 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 243.
71 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 244.
72 S. Hutton, ‘Liberty, Equality and God: The Religious Roots of Catherine Macaulay’s Feminism’, in Knott and Taylor,
Gender and Enlightenment, 538–50.
73 B. Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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armed [females] against the artiﬁces and deceit of the males’.74 Far from being the product of
reﬁned civilization, modesty linked women to animals. Rooted in resistance to sexual advances,
it was ‘by no means conﬁned to the human species’; indeed, Smellie noted that even female
insects ‘repel the ﬁrst attacks of the males’, and commented, ‘[i]f this is not modesty, it has all
the effects of it’.75 Wollstonecraft does not discuss this side of Smellie’s work in her Analytical
review, but she certainly noticed it. In chapter 4 of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, she
takes issue with Smellie’s view, itself derived from Buffon, that women mature by 20, men not till
30. Referring to ‘some naturalists’ who have made this claim, she suggests ‘that they reason on
false ground, led astray by the male prejudice, which deems beauty the perfection of women […]
whilst male beauty is allowed to have some connection with the mind’.76 Thus she offers an early
feminist critique of the supposed objectivity and neutrality of male-authored science.
Smellie’s understanding of gender difference depended on seeing the mind as essentially part of
the body and determined by it. This anti-Cartesianism characterises his discussion of human-animal
relations as well. Where Buffon argued that it is not man’s bodily conformity with the bodies of
animals but his spiritual difference from them that counts, Smellie concentrated on bodily simi-
larities, and tended to emphasize the connections between human and animal. He considered
that those who denied mind to non-human animals, considering in Cartesian fashion that they
were only machines, were mistaken. Animals’ instincts ranged from simple ones like an infant’s
instinct to suck, to more complex ones that could adapt behaviour to different circumstances,
and which could be altered by experience and observation. The distinction usually made
between human reason and animal instinctwas a false one. ‘No such distinction exists’, he declared:
‘the reasoning faculty itself is a necessary result of instinct’.77Man just hasmore instincts than other
animals:
The superiority of man over the other animals seems to depend chieﬂy on the great number of instincts
with which his mind is endowed. Traces of every instinct he possesses are discoverable in the brute
creation. But no particular species enjoys the whole. On the contrary, most species are limited to a
small number. This appears to be the reason why the instincts of brutes are stronger, and more
steady in their operation, than those of man. A being activated by a great variety of motives must
necessarily reason, or, in other words, hesitate in his choice.78
While a feminist must call Smellie socially conservative in his views on women, an advocate for
animals must acknowledge his progressive stance on human-animal relations. The latter should
not be exaggerated: Smellie is still committed to a belief in ‘the superiority of man over the other
animals’, but it is a superiority based on a difference in degree, not of kind, between them. Man is
part of the same chain of being, and in complete agreement with the logic of the principle of conti-
nuity, Smellie considers it possible that some animals may approach near to humanity even in that
supposedly distinctive human quality of mind. He summarizes his discussion of instinct in this way:
This view of instinct is simple, removes every objection to the existence of mind in brutes, and unfolds
all their actions, by referring them to motives perfectly similar to those by which man is actuated. There
74 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 237.
75 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 238.
76 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 138; see Buffon, Natural History, General and Particular, vol. 2, 436.
77 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 144–5.
78 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 152.
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is, perhaps, a greater difference between the mental powers of some animals than between man and the
most sagacious brutes.79
In Wollstonecraft’s review of Smellie, it is his discussion of instinct and animal mind to which she
most strongly objects:
That ‘there is, perhaps, a greater difference between the mental powers of some animals than there is
between those of man and the most sagacious brutes.’ – Here we differ. – Again; ‘Instincts may be
considered as so many internal senses, of which some animals have a greater, and others a smaller
number. These senses in different species, are likewise more or less ductile; and the animals possessing
them are, of course, more or less susceptible of improving, and of acquiring knowledge’.
We acknowledge that we do not clearly comprehend what the author means […] by more or less
ductile – unless in his ardour to prove that animals have minds similar to the human intellect, he
meant to deprive us of souls. [Wollstonecraft’s italics]80
Wollstonecraft’s objection is to Smellie’s view that mental powers can be explained as part of
bodily processes – a view that grew rapidly during the late eighteenth century, inﬂuenced by
Petrus Camper’s anatomical comparisons of men and orang-outangs. A new emphasis on the
mental effects of physical differences in skulls and brains potentially threatened the Cartesian
feminist argument that the sexlessness of souls ensured the fundamental mental equality of the
sexes. For anthropological thinkers like Blumenbach, Camper and Herder, man’s superiority
over the animals was guaranteed not by a rational soul but by the superior functioning of
bodily organs.81 In the Vindication of the Rights of WomanWollstonecraft continues her response
to this physicalist trend in late eighteenth-century thought, sardonically broaching the idea that
since souls have no sex, women’s ‘inferiority must depend on the organs’.82 Her argument
against this physicalist view of female inferiority rests on the appeal to a God-given reason separ-
able from the body.
For Wollstonecraft, then, Smellie’s picture of humans as instinctive animals threatens to rob us
of the distinction on which she was to build her feminist case. Faced with Smellie’s version of the
chain of being, a version in which the orang-outang’s physical closeness to humanity indicates
close mental afﬁnities between us, she is moved to scoff at the whole notion of the chain
linking us to animals:
The elephant is undoubtedly the most sagacious of animals, consequently, is the next link to man in this
fanciful chain, but Mr. S. forgetting what he has recounted of its abilities, makes it give way to the
orang-outang, only because the outward form of the latter has a nearer resemblance to the human
body. ‘Man,’ he tells us, ‘in his lowest condition, is evidently linked, both in the form of his body,
and the capacity of his mind, to the large and small orang-outangs.’ – Then he is far inferior to the ele-
phant – but we dispute the fact.83
The traditional notion that the elephant was one of the most intelligent of beasts did not disturb in
the way that the elevation of the orang-outang did. Elephants do not look like us. Chimpanzees
79 Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 156.
80 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 7, 295–6.
81 Wokler, ‘The Ape Debates’, 1172–3.
82 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 103.
83 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 7, 300.
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do, and as we have seen, the belief in the orang-outang as the missing link in the chain was
coupled with the notion that the Hottentots formed another link on the human side, and that it
was in sexual congress with Hottentot females that male orang-outangs demonstrated both
their beastliness and their afﬁnity with humanity. A further disturbing closeness between ape
and human was suggested by the emerging view that it was only in bodily organs that the two
differed. For all these reasons, Wollstonecraft found in the notion of orang-outang as missing
link implications that threatened to reduce woman, her mind like the orang-outang’s determined
by her body, to being something similar to but not quite measuring up to ‘mankind’: ‘the link
which unites man with brutes’.
Wollstonecraft’s use of this highly charged phrase was also inﬂuenced, I suggest, by Edmund
Burke, whose 1790 Reﬂections on the Revolution in France contained some highly provocative
remarks on the effects of revolutionary thinking on women’s status. Burke was scathing about
those revolutionary social theorists who, inﬂuenced by Rousseau’s ideas on inequality, wanted
to dismantle the unnatural social distinctions produced by an artiﬁcial society, and to move
towards a natural state of equality. In his view, this would be a return to a state of savagery.
Drawing on the by now long tradition of Enlightenment thinking that equated social progress
with a gentler and more respectful treatment of women, he used the status of women as a touch-
stone for the good society; but it was in medieval times, when the code of chivalry operated, that
he placed the height of progress. Burke complained that in the post-Revolutionary world chivalry
was dead, and that without the ‘pleasing illusions, which made power gentle’, there is left only a
world of naked aggression: ‘In this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman;
a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order’.84 In other words, without
royalty and the civilisation it upholds, humanity will move back to a savage state in which
woman’s physical weakness will leave her subject to the full force of man’s dominance
without any of the factors that currently soften it. Wollstonecraft, revolutionary that she was,
had to rise to that challenge, and ﬁnd a way to uncouple female dignity from that of kings and
queens. In her Vindication of the Rights of Men she emphasized the importance of natural
rights derived from human status: people, however low in rank, are not to be treated as brute
beasts:
It is necessary emphatically to repeat, that there are rights which men inherit at their birth, as rational
creatures, who were raised above the brute creation by their improvable faculties; and that, in receiving
these, not from their forefathers but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural rights.85
She tackled Burke’s explosive claim about woman as animal directly, setting a democratic sense
of humans’ necessary commitment to each other against his standard of humanity as aristocratic
hierarchy. She quoted his phrase: ‘On this scheme of things a king is but a man; a queen is but a
woman; a woman is but an animal, and an animal not of the highest order’, with the comment: ‘ –
All true, Sir; if she is not more attentive to the duties of humanity than queens and fashionable
ladies in general are’.86 In her review of Smellie’s work, Wollstonecraft accuses him of
denying, by implication, the existence of the human soul. In the Vindication of the Rights of
Men she accuses Burke, more speciﬁcally, of denying a soul to women. Taking him to task for
84 E. Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 171.
85 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 14.
86 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 25.
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having, in his Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful, equated littleness, beauty and femininity, and
for having deﬁned woman as a creature designed to please man, she says that the logical end of his
views is that ‘if virtue has any other foundation than worldly utility, you have clearly proved that
one half of the human species, at least, have not souls’.87
In her Vindication of the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft returns to the status of woman as
animal, and, as we have seen, concedes that in physical terms men have the advantage. Seen
simply as physical, as animal, woman would indeed, in her view, be an animal not of the
highest order. Yet Wollstonecraft is absolutely committed to the ﬁrst two of Burke’s ventrilo-
quised Revolutionary positions: a king is but a man, and a queen is but a woman. So everything
depends on her denying the link between these and the third proposition: a woman is but an
animal. When she speculates on woman as the link which unites man with brutes she is offering
a challenge to Burke: a challenge to live the Revolution. Maybe without the trappings of the old
civilization, women would just be subordinate animals, but Wollstonecraft’s faith in woman’s
share of humanity’s unique rationality made her willing to take the risk.
In conclusion, we can see that natural history had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the development of
eighteenth-century feminism. Some elements in the natural historians’ work encouraged a socio-
logical analysis of the historical causes of women’s degeneration from an original equality to an
unnatural slavery. More prominent though, were the essentialist interpretations of the relation
between bodily and mental powers, and of female qualities shared across species, that served
to naturalise female subordination. These prompted Wollstonecraft’s restatement of women’s
share in a fundamental human difference from animals. Enlightenment feminism was not essen-
tially or originally committed to human-animal dualism: indeed a recurrent strain within it was a
reminder of the kinship between animal and human and a call for humane treatment of animals.
But for the major late-Enlightenment feminist Mary Wollstonecraft, particular pressures from the
natural historians’ interpretation of humanity’s relationship with the orang-outang, coupled with
the Revolutionary debate over women’s status in the controversial state of nature, pushed her
work towards an uncompromising restatement of humanity’s monopoly on reason, and a
reinforcement of the barrier between human and animal nature. The Vindication’s radicalism
on women went along with a conservative view of humanity’s relationship to animals.
University of Exeter
87 Wollstonecraft, Works, vol. 5, 45.
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